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THE STRANGELY UNSETTLED STATE OF
PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOR
IN THE PAST THIRTY YEARS
Joseph Slater'
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor law in the public sector is, and has been for at least the past
thirty years, central to labor relations in the U.S. and, increasingly, it has
acquired a high profile in the political world. It is common knowledge
that union density as a whole has dropped precipitously in the past three
decades. In 1983, overall union density in the U.S. was 20.1 percent,
with 17.7 million members; by 2012, it was 11.3 percent, with 14.4
million members.' These numbers, however, mask the stark contrast
between the public and private sectors. In 2012, union density
(measured by actual union membership) in the public sector was 35.9
percent, while the private sector figure was 6.6 percent. 2 Measuring
union density in the public sector by counting all the employees unions
represent, the figure is 39.6 percent overall (and, for local government
employment, 45.2 percent).3 The high union density in the public sector,
combined with declining unionization rates in the private sector, meant
that by 2009, public-sector workers had become a majority of all union
members in the U.S. Yet despite this success in organizing, publicsector labor law and labor relations have been in a state of tumult in the
past thirty years. .This includes, but is definitely not limited to, laws
passed in 2011 and 2012 in about a dozen states gutting the rights of
public-sector unions and their members.4 Scholars have commented on
the increased "oscillations" of private-sector labor law in the last thirty
Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members Summary (Jan 23,
2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
2. Id.
3. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE 3: UNION AFFILIATION OF
EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY (Jan. 23, 2013),

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.
4. See infra Part V.
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years, with the National Labor Relations Board changing positions on
various issues depending on which party was in power.5 However,
public-sector labor law in the past thirty years has experienced much
wilder swings back and forth: not only through agency interpretation,
but also through significant rewriting of statutes, and the creation and
elimination of statutes.
In a way, this is odd. Although it took public-unions longer to win
collective bargaining rights than private-sector unions (as discussed
below, the first state public sector statute came in 1959), by the 1980s it
seemed as if public-sector collective bargaining was widely, if not
universally, accepted, and it was functioning in a fairly stable manner.
Union density in the public sector in 1980 was already close to forty
percent.7 Yet the next three decades would feature surprising instability,
with a number of dramatic wins and losses.8 This is partly because,
unlike private-sector labor law, public-sector law primarily is state and
local labor law.9 Thus, these laws both vary considerably and are more
subject to political shifts at a local level. A minority of states does not
permit any public employees to bargain, and another minority only
permits a few types of public employees to bargain.o Specifically, by
2007, seven states had no provision for collective bargaining, and two
states had only more limited "meet and confer" statutes." Thirteen
states allowed only one to four types of public workers to bargain (most
Also, where collective
commonly teachers and firefighters).1 2
5. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (15'h ed. 2011), 76-77
(tracing the beginning of a more partisan NLRB to the Reagan administration and noting the
continuation and arguable exacerbation of the trend to the present); Steven Porzio, NLRB Chairman
Addresses LaborLaw Reform at American Bar Association Meeting, UNIONS AND LAB. L. REFORM
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2009, 1:52 PM), http:// www.efcablog.com/2009/1 1/articles/craig-becker-nlrb/nlrb(former NLRB Chair
chairman-addresses-labor-law-reform-at-american-bar-association-meeting/
Wilma Liebman "argued that Congressional inaction has fostered 'deep divisions' and 'controversy'
in labor law and has 'facilitated' the NLRB's 'flip-flopping' and 'policy oscillation."').
6. See infra Parts II-III.
7. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence Between
the Public and PrivateSectors I fig.1 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper
No. 503, 2005), available at http://harris.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/503.pdf.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. Section 2 of The National Labor Relations Act excludes the public sector. 29 U.S.C. §
152(2) (2006).
10. See Richard B. Freeman & Eunice S. Han, Public Sector Unionism Without Collective
Bargaining,
AMERICAN
EcoN.
ASS'N
3
(Jan.
6,
2012),
http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2013conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=326.
11.

See RICHARD C. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 62-64 (4"' ed.,

2009).
12. Id. About 89 percent of public employees are covered by a public employee labor law.
Jeffrey H. Keefe, A Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of Wellington's and Winter's, The
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bargaining is authorized, the scope of bargaining is generally narrower sometimes quite a bit narrower - than in the private sector.13 Further,
the majority of states do not allow any public employees to strike.14
While most states that provide collective bargaining rights to public
employees allow some form of binding "interest arbitration" to settle
contract disputes, some states only allow voluntary arbitration, nonbinding arbitration, or only mediation and/or fact-finding."
Because there is so much variation in the public sector, there is no
single story of the past thirty years to tell. Life for public-sector unions
in states like Virginia and North Carolina, where no such union is
permitted to bargain,' 6 is different from life in states such as New York
and California where such bargaining is well-established and under no
immediate threat.' 7 Both of these stories, in turn, differ from states such
as Wisconsin where a robust collective-bargaining statute in place for
half a century was recently almost completely gutted, which in turns
differs from Ohio, where such a move was enacted as law but then
beaten back by a voter referendum.' 8
Thus, this paper will discuss illustrative events over the past thirty
years: significant events which helped shape the broader history of labor
relations, even influencing the private sector. In sum, even though a
majority of states had granted collective bargaining rights to public
employees by the 1980s, contests over the basic question of whether
public employees should have such rights have continued over this entire
stretch of time. These events feature defeats and victories, and show
continuing debates over the foundations and principles of labor law and
relations in the public sector: in short, how public sector labor relations
remains a strangely unsettled issue.
This article starts with early history of public sector labor law
(because it is necessary to understand some of the events of the past
Union and the Cities, 34 COMP. LAB. LAW & POL'Y J. 251, 262 (2013).
13. See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES, & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 457-554 (2d ed. 2010).
14 See KEARNEY, supra note 11, at 233-34.
15. MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 555-674; KEARNEY, supra note 11, at 23334 (listing the thirteen states that, in 2008, permitted some public employees to strike), 259-60
(listing alternative procedures each state uses to settle public-sector bargaining impasses).
16. See Ann C. Hodges & William Warwick, The Sheathed Sword: Public Sector Union
Efficacy in Non-Bargaining States, 27 A.B.A. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 275, 275-76 (2012).
17 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 17; JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD
REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 243 (2011)
('[T]he Meyers-Milias Brown Act in 1968 ... cleared the way for local governments in California
to bargain collectively with their employees.").
18. See infra Part V.
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thirty years), and then moves to the last three decades. For the 1980s, it
discusses two key (and contrasting) events of the early part of the
decade: the crushing defeat of the PATCO strike, and the enactment of
the Ohio public-sector labor statute. It then discusses some significant
twists and turns in the 1990s. Moving to the twenty-first century, it
discusses some (mostly positive) trends for public-sector unions in the
first decade of the century, but then turns to the wave of anti-union
legislation in 2011 and beyond (although even here, there are some
developments in the other direction). The final sections discuss the
practical and theoretical policy issues at stake, and attempt to make some
guesses at the future of this unsettled area.
II. EARLIER HISTORY
While public-sector unions have, for decades, been central to the
U.S. labor movement, labor historians have focused much more on the
private sector.19 Thus, it is worth highlighting some of the major events
of public sector labor history, in the first half of the twentieth century.
This history is important for several reasons. The events and debates of
this era still influence discussions of policy today. For example, we
cannot understand what happened in Wisconsin in 2011 without
knowing what happened there in 1959. The early history is also
important because in some states, the law is in many ways the same as it
was a century ago: e.g., in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
other states where public-sector unions still have no right to bargain
collectively. 20 Also, the history helps explain why it is that in the U.S.,
public-sector labor law is so different from private-sector law. After all,
in most other industrialized democracies, the laws governing public
19. See generally Joseph A. McCartin, Bringing the State's Workers In: Time to Rectify an
Imbalanced U.S. Labor Historiography,47 LAB. HIST. 73 (2006); Robert Shaffer, Where are the
Organized Public Employees? The Absence of Public Employee Unionism from U.S. History
Textbooks, and Why it Matters, 43 LAB. HIST. 315, 323 (2002) ("Of the 12 college textbooks
reviewed, only two ... offer any substantive discussion of public employee unionism."). The two
principal overviews of the history of public sector unions are JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE 1900-62 (2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC
WORKERS], and the much older but still useful STERLING D. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER
(1948). Some works focus on specific unions or a specific type of employee. See, e.g., JOSHUA B.
FREEMAN, INTRANSIT: THE TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION INNEW YORK CITY, 1933-1966 (1989);
JOHN LYONS, TEACHERS AND REFORM: CHICAGO PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1929-70 (2008); MCCARTIN,
supra note 17; Marick F. Masters, AFSCME as a Political Union, 19 J. OF LAB. RES. 313 (1998);
Gregory M. Saltzman, Bargaining Laws as a Cause and a Consequence of the Growth of Teacher
Unionism, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 335 (1985).
20. See Freeman & Han, supra note 10, at 17 tbl. 1.
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sector labor unions and those governing private sector labor unions are
and have long been very similar if not identical. 21 Although the first
state law authorizing public-sector collective bargaining was not passed
until 1959,22 public workers organized throughout the first half of the
twentieth century. 23 Indeed, in the first two decades of the century,
public-sector unions were on the rise. A number of major public-sector
unions were formed in the early 20th century.24 In 1910, union density
in the public sector was 3.5 percent; from 1915 to 1921, this density
increased from 4.8 to 7.2 percent. 25 Given the simultaneous expansion
of government, this meant that from 1915 through 1921, the total
number of public workers in unions nearly doubled.26
But the Boston police strike of 1919 cut short this growth. Boston
Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis caused this strike by banning Boston
police officers from joining a union affiliated with the AFL and
suspending officers who refused to leave the affiliated union. 27 The
police officers had sought out the AFL because of complaints - common
to workers then and now - about low wages, long hours, and unhealthy
working conditions.2 8 Opponents of police union unions (in Boston and
elsewhere) argued that unionized police would not be neutral in strikes
by private-sector unions.29
The strike began on September 9, 1919 and was a disaster. 30 For
the three days, crime was rampant in the city.3 ' State guards finally
intervened, killing nine and wounding twenty-three others.32 Many more
were injured during the strike, and there was extensive property

21. For example, public workers in Britain and France won bargaining rights in the first part
of the twentieth century largely similar to those of private sector workers in those countries. See
PUBLIC WORKERS, supra note 19, at 92-93.
22. See generally id. at ch. 6.
23. Id.
24. In 1906, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) created its first national union of
government workers, the National Federation of Post Office Clerks. Id. at 18. In 1916, the AFL
formed the American Federation of Teachers. Id. In 1917, the AFL created the National Federation
of Federal Employees, and both the National Association of Letter Carriers and the Railway Mail
Carriers affiliated with the AFL. Id The AFL chartered its first firefighters local in 1903 and
created the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) in 1918. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id at 26.
28. See id. at 25.
29. See id. at 22.
30. See id at 26.

31.

See id. at 13.

32.

Id at 13-14.
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damage. 3 After the strike was crushed, all 1,147 strikers were fired and
never reinstated.34
The aftermath of the Boston strike significantly damaged publicsector unionism. Many local governments banned not just police
unions, but also all forms of public sector unions.35 Even though such
unions stressed their no-strike policies fierce opposition to such unions
led to an end to the early period of growth. The rate of unionization in
the public sector stagnated below the 1921 rate of 7.2 percent through
the rest of the 1920s. 36 For decades after the strike, policymakers and
judges associated all forms of public-sector unionism with the horror of
the Boston strike. Even though all AFL (and, later, CIO) unions
renounced strikes, and even though from 1920 until the late 1960s,
public-sector unions almost never struck, 7 the image of police striking
was associated with all public-sector unions. Courts through the early
1960s consistently upheld "yellow dog" rules barring union membership
in government employment, insisting that public-sector union organizing
would inevitably lead to public workers striking.
In the 1980s,
President Ronald Reagan was influenced by the Boston strike when he
fired illegally striking members of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Union in 1981. 39 The specter of the Boston strike continues
to influence even academic discussion of the public-sector labor.4 0
A. The FirstPublic-SectorLabor Law in Wisconsin, and Developing
Alternative Forms ofDispute Resolution in the PublicSector
The first public-sector labor law was passed (perhaps ironically,
given recent events) in Wisconsin in 1959, and then amended in 1962.41
This event too, is important in understanding events of the past thirty
33. Id. at 13-14, 27.
34. See id at 14, 34.
35 See id at 35-36.
36. Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 82.
38. For examples and details, see id at ch. 3; Joseph Slater, The Court Does Not Know
"What a Labor Union is: How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)ConstructionsDeformed Public
Sector Labor Law," 79 OR. L. REv. 981, 991 (2000) [hereinafter Deformed Public Sector Labor
Law].
39. MCCARTIN, supra note 17, at 321; see discussion infra Part M.A.1.
40.

See, e.g., NORMA RICCUCI ET AL. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT: POLITICS

AND PROCESS 477 (6th ed., 2007) (although "many years have elapsed" between the Boston police
strike and the present, "the basic problems involved are essentially the same and remain without
substantial resolution.").
41. PUBLIC WORKERS, supranote 19, at 158-59.
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years.
Proponents of public-sector collective bargaining in Wisconsin
began attempting to pass such a law in 195 1.42 Central to the debates
over the bills and the enacted legislation was an issue that remains
central today in public-sector labor law. Assuming public-sector unions
are not allowed to strike, how can bargaining impasses be resolved? The
Wisconsin law for the first time was a realistic attempt to create
alternative forms of dispute resolution for unions of government
employees.4 3
After almost a decade of watching earlier bills fail - in part because
of concerns over police strikes and in part because Republicans
controlled state government - advocates, led by the public-sector union
AFSCME, introduced a bill in 1959." It contained the right to organize,
and it specified that if bargaining reached impasse, a state agency could
mediate and conduct voluntary arbitrations. 45 A modified version of this
bill became law, but the section authorizing the WERB to aid in
bargaining impasses was dropped.46
The law led to many contracts between unions and local
governments in Wisconsin.47 But it was still unclear what, exactly,
should happen when bargaining came to an impasse.4 8 In 1961,
AFSCME introduced a bill that amended the 1959 law such that at
impasse, the parties could ask the WERB for a mediator or fact-finder.
Also, under the 1961 Wisconsin bill, WERB officials could act as
mediators or arbitrators.so Also, impasses could be resolved through a
voluntary, non-binding arbitration process.51
While there have been many developments in this area, this law
was a significant precedent for modern public-sector labor laws.
Mediation and fact-finding are now common in such statutes. 52
Typically, fact-finders find facts relevant to the bargaining impasse and
offer recommendations.53 Today, arbitration at impasse to set contract
42.
43.
44.
45
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
251-83.
53.

Id. at 159-60.
See id at ch. 6.
See id. at 158-59.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181-83.
See id. at 185.
Id. at 184-85.
Id at 186.
Id
Id. at 186-87.
See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 611-15; KEARNEY, supra note 11, at
See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 612-15; KEARNEY, supra note 11, at
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terms - so-called "interest arbitration" - is also common in the public
sector.54 Although it is now more often mandatory and binding - and
indeed, the Wisconsin law was later amended to provide for binding,
mandatory interest arbitration5 5 - both "voluntary" and "advisory"
models still exist.56
The Wisconsin law sparked a national trend. Federal employees
won a limited right to bargain collectively soon after in 1962, when
President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988.57 By 1966, sixteen
states had enacted laws granting organizing and bargaining rights to at
least some public workers. 8 By the end of the 1970s, a majority of
states had adopted such laws. 59 Public-sector unionization increased
rapidly as well. AFSCME grew from approximately 125,000 members
in 1955 to more than a million members by 1978.60 In 1955, all the
public-sector unions put together had a combined membership of around
400,000; by the 1970s, the total was more than 4,000,000.61 Also, in the
late 1960s, courts held for the first time that the First Amendment of the
Constitution prevents a public employer from firing or otherwise
discriminating against a public employee because of union activities. 62
This was a major departure from the precedent of the first half of the 20 1
century, and it put an end to "yellow-dog" and other official bans on
union organizing in the public sector that were common through the
early 1960s.
With more legal rights and a greater acceptance from the public,
union organizing in the public sector continued to increase. By 1975,
the union density rate in the public sector equaled that of the private
sector (around 25 percent). 64 The public-sector rate then increased to
251-70.
54.
55.

See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 615.
See William C. Houlihan, Interest Arbitrationand Municipal Employee Bargaining: The

Wisconsin Experience, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF

EIGHT STATES 69, 82-84 (Joyce Najita & James Stem, eds. 2001).
56. See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 615-74; KEARNEY supra note 11, at
271-86.
57. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963).
58. PUBLIC WORKERS, supra note 19, at 191.
59. Chris Edwards, Public-Sector Unions, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN (Mar.
2010), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb 61.pdf.
60. Fighting for Working Families: A Short History of AFSCME, AFSCME,
http://www.afscme.org/union/history/afscme-75-years-of-history (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
61. PUBLIC WORKERS, supranote 19, at 193.
62. Deformed Public Sector LaborLaw, supra note 38, at 1006-07.
63. See MALIN, HODGES, & SLATER, supra note 13, at 274-80; Deformed Public Sector
LaborLaw, supranote 38, at 1006.
64. See Farber,supranote 7, at I fig. 1.
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about 38 percent in 1979, and has stayed around that level ever since,
i.e., for the last thirty years.65
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PAST 30 YEARS (OR SO)
A. The 1980s: A Defeat and a Victory
Thus, by the 1980s, unions in the public sector had accomplished
quite a lot, both in terms of legal doctrine and actual organizing. Still,
even the modem history of public-sector labor relations has proven to be
rocky and highly contested. This section describes an important defeat
and an important victory for public-sector unions in this decade: first, the
defeat of the PATCO strike; second, the victory of the Ohio publicsector statute.
1. The PATCO Strike of 1981
On August 3, 1981, more than 12,000 air traffic controllers
represented by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
walked off their job in an illegal strike (federal employees cannot strike
per statute).
President Reagan announced that if the strikers did not
return to work within forty-eight hours, they would be fired and
permanently replaced. They did not, and they were.
The crushing
defeat of this strike is one of the most important events in all of labor
relations - not just the public sector - of the past half century. As
historian Joseph McCartin shows, it had a lasting impact on publicsector labor relations, private-sector labor relations, and U.S. politics in
general.
PATCO was founded in 1968, organized pursuant to the Kennedy
Executive Order described above. 70 The union had engaged in some job
actions before: a slow-down in 1968 that brought some improvements
the union sought, and "blue flu" type actions in 1969 and 1970 that were

65.
66.

See id.
MCCARTIN, supranote 17, at 6.

67.

Id. at 7.

68. Joseph A. McCartin, The Strike that Busted Unions, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 2, 2011, at A25,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs-patco-the-strike-that-bustedunions.html?_r-0.
69. See the excellent recent history of this and surrounding events, MCCARTIN, supra note 17.
Most of the information in this section is taken from this work.
70. Id. at 9, 35-69.
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not successful.
Still, by 1977, PATCO had become one of the most
aggressive of all the unions in the federal government.72 Controllers
were now operating under President Nixon's Executive Order 11491,
which expanded the rights available under the Kennedy Executive
Order.73 Under their first contract, PATCO took advantage of the new
right to binding grievance arbitration, winning the majority of its cases.
By 1976, PATCO had 13,681 members: 85 percent of controllers
eligible to join.7 4
Warning signs appeared, however, as future contracts proved more
difficult to negotiate. There was a continuing tension between the fact
that controller wages were not keeping up with inflation, 75 and the legal
rule that controllers (like most federal employees) were not permitted to
negotiate over wages.7 6 This led to job actions that foreshadowed the
1981 strike. In 1974, controllers had engaged in a "rolling delays" job
action that forced the FAA to agree to certain union terms. However,
later on, an attempt to win a pay increase by "reclassifying" controllers
into a higher grade was rejected by President Ford (who, under advice
from Dick Cheney, was trying to avoid being outflanked on the right by
Ronald Reagan). This led to another staggered slowdown job action
by controllers. 79 Attempts at compromise failed, leaving both sides
angry.80 Even after Jimmy Carter was elected, controllers threatened a
job action that would disrupt his inauguration.8 ' This threat was not
carried out, in large part because PATCO won an agreement to reclassify
"up" a large number of controller jobs.82
In addition to wage complaints, in the later 1970s, the job of
controller was changing, and not for the better. Deregulation of the
airline industry created the modern "hub and spoke" system, making
"hub" airports even busier.83 New automation, which did not always

71. Id.at79-119.
72. Id. at 145.
73. For example, it created a mediation and arbitration system to resolve bargaining impasses
(the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Federal Service Impasses Panel,
respectively), which both still exist and perform similar functions today. Id. at 135.
74. Id. at 150-51, 153, 156.
75. Id. at 162-63.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 159-61.
78. Id. at 163-65.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id at 167-70.
81. Id. at 171-73.
82. Id. at 173.
83. Id. at 198.
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work well, posed challenges as well.84 Similar trends sparked militancy
in other countries, as controllers in Canada, Germany, France, Australia,
and Britain staged job actions.
In 1978, understaffing and new but
unreliable technologies in the U.S. arguably caused a rise in the number
of "near misses" and a fatal accident in San Diego.86 Militants began to
gain a larger voice within PATCO. They were unhappy with contract
negotiations in 1978, and they pushed for a job action, but the resulting
slowdown did not have solid support within the union, and it was a
failure.
Clouds continued to gather. Hopes that Carter would expand the
narrow scope of bargaining in the federal sector were soon dashed.88
While the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 codified collective
bargaining rights for federal employees and made some improvements in
the process, it did not widen the scope of bargaining. Wages were still
not negotiable. 90 These disappointments, plus cutbacks in retirement and
other programs, led some factions within PATCO to push the idea of a
strike.91 At the same time, the new anti-tax political movement helped
create less sympathy for public-sector unions. The Wall Street Journalin a piece that could have been republished in 2011 - crowed hopefully
about a coming "schism between private and public employee
unionism. ,92 PATCO President John Leyden was on the defensive,
insisting that, "We are not the overpaid, underworked .. . federal
employee that the normal person in this country, who looks at federal
employees, thinks."93 In early 1980, the more militant Bob Poli
successfully challenged Leyden for leadership of the union. 94 FAA
leaders began strike preparations. 95
Meanwhile, in the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan
attempted to woo disaffected union members. While Governor of
California, Reagan had actually signed into law the California state
statute granting collective bargaining rights to employees of local and

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 197-200.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 202-04.
Id. at 206-12.
Id. at 212-14
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218-26.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 227-30.
Id. at 233-36.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

522

[Vol. 30:511

municipal governments.96 Reagan wrote to PATCO, agreeing that
controllers "worked unreasonable hours," and promised improved
equipment and better scheduling. 9 7 This was more than Carter would
say, and PATCO endorsed Reagan.98
In the 1981 negotiations, PATCO pushed for higher pay. 99 For the
better-compensated federal employees, the gap between pay increases
and inflation was even larger than for other federal workers. 00 While
federal law still did not permit the union to negotiate over pay,tol
PATCO leaders seemed confident that a strike would yield their desired
results. 10 2 In negotiations, attempts at compromise failed.103 On July 2,
1981, PATCO rejected the contract offer, essentially ensuring there
would be a strike.104 Meanwhile, the FAA made a series of contingency
plans, crucially enlisting the cooperation of the airlines. 05 Also, the
Reagan administration decided to respond to any strike in a severe and
unprecedented manner.106
The strike began on August 3, 1981.107 Ninety percent of the
controllers were absent in New York and Boston; only six controllers
showed up for work at O'Hare Airport in Chicago.10 8
Reagan
announced that if the strikers did not return within forty-eight hours,
they would all be fired.' 09 In another bad sign for the union, neither the
Pilots Union nor the Machinists Union was willing to strike in
solidarity.1 o Still, few strikers defected within the forty-eight hour
period."' The strike did create significant delays, and it cost the airline
industry an estimated $1 billion per month at the outset. 12 But between
supervisors, military controllers who had not worked in the FAA before,
furloughed pilots, new trainees, and strike defectors, the FAA held on.1 3
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 243-45.
Id at 246-47.
Id at 247-49.

99. Id. at 237.
100. Id. at 237-38.
101. See id. at 237-41.
102. See id. at 257-62.
103. Id at 265-74.
104. Id. at 274-76.
105. Id. at 281-83.
106. Id at 277-85.
107. Id at 287-88.
108. Id. at 289.

109.
110.

Id at 289-90.
Id at 291-92.

111.
112.
113.

Id at 295-97.
Id at 304.
Id at 301-04.
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Although there were twice as many "hazard reports" in the first month of
the strike than normal, there was no highly-publicized disaster.'14
The Reagan administration then took the most punitive position
toward strikers possible. Striking controllers were not just fired, but
arrested and criminally charged (the federal sector statute makes striking
a crime) - a number were actually convicted.'" PATCO was ordered to
pay $28.8 million in damages.116 Leaders of the AFL-CIO tried to work
out a compromise such that most of the strikers would be rehired, and
some administration officials supported such a move, but this came to
naught."' 7 After the strike had been defeated, a number of voices,
ranging from the Washington Post to conservatives William Safire and
Jack Kemp called for reinstatement.i18 But all Reagan would offer is to
limit the penalty of a ban on all federal employment to a ban on
employment with the FAA." 9 The FAA also made a standard part of its
contract with private companies a clause that barred those companies
from employment any former controller who had struck; this and the
FAA bar remained until President Clinton repealed these policies in
1993.120 The administration fought every reinstatement case brought to
the Merit Systems Protection Board, and would not consider clemency
for a single PATCO striker.' 2 '
This strike had an enduring impact, redolent of themes throughout
public sector history. Reagan's firing of all the controllers reminded
some (and perhaps Reagan himself) of Calvin Coolidge firing the Boston
police strikers.122 In 2011, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker invoked
Reagan and PATCO while pushing through a law stripping collective
bargaining rights from most public employees in Wisconsin (discussed
further infra).123 Further, McCartin argues that the rejection of
Republicans who pushed for reinstatement of some strikers helped
marginalize Republicans who were more moderate on union issues and
strengthened the hard-core anti-union factions that would gain control
114. Id. at 307. There was one collision that caused one death on August 19, 1981. Id. at 309.
After the strike had been lost, on January 13, 1982, a plane crash in Washington, DC - caused in
part by the errors of a controller who had been a supervisor - killed seventy-eight people. But it
was too late to matter. Id. at 325-26.
115. Id. at 305.
116. Id.

117.

Id. at 313-15.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.at 320.
Id. at 320-24.
MALN, HODGES, & SLATER, supra note 13, at 589.
Id. at 335-36.
MCCARTIN, supra note 17, at 342.
Id. at 229, 365-66.
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later. 124 Even more broadly, McCartin writes "no strike since the advent
of the New Deal damaged the U.S. labor movement more."l 25 Through
the 1980s, strikes decreased in the public sector, and in the private
sector, strikebreaking - through the use of permanent replacement
workers - increased dramatically. 126 Further, "Reagan's breaking of the
PATCO strike, more than any other act of his presidency, also
announced the dawn of a conservative era."l 2 7 As to the controllers, a
1986 study found that one-third of them had incomes so low that they
qualified for food stamps. 12 8
2. The Ohio Public-Sector Statute
A much more positive event for public-sector unions in the 1980s
came in 1983 - thirty years ago - when Ohio passed a statute granting

collective bargaining and related rights to public employees.129 While
this statute came after most states had enacted such laws, Ohio's law
was, and remains quite robust - despite an attempt to eviscerate it in
2011 discussed infra. It has broad coverage, a relatively wide scope of
bargaining, and it even permits most covered employees to strike. 130 As
in Wisconsin, it took quite some time to pass the law. 13 1 The struggle
leading up to the law's enactment is instructive, as are the effects the law
had on strikes.13 2 As in other states, in Ohio, union activity in the public
sector came significantly before formal statutory rights. As far back as
1947, in reaction to such activity, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in
Hagerman v. Dayton,133 that local governments could not grant unions
dues check-off (voluntary deductions of dues from paychecks). It also
held (consistent with a view that dominated in the first half of the
124. Id. at 336-38.
125. Id. at 300.
126 Id. at 340-41, 350.
127. Id. at 330. For example, McCartin quotes George Will: "In a sense, the '60s ended in
August 1981." Id
128. Id at 332.
129. James T. O'Reilly & Neil Garth, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective Bargaining
Law ofPublic Employees, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 891, 895 (1983).
130. The modem statute is codified at OHIO REv. CODE Ann. § 4117 (West 2007); Joseph
Slater, The Rise and Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in Historicaland Political
Context, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 473, 479 (2012) [hereinafter Rise and Fall]
131. See Rise and Fall, supranote 130, at 477, 479.
132. See id. at 479-480 (discussing these topics in more detail); History of Public Employee
Collective Bargaining in
Ohio,
SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-SUN
(Sept.
18,
2011),
http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/news/national-govt-politics/history-of-public-employeecollective-bargaining-1/nMt5S/ (explaining a short overview of this history).
133. 71 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio 1947).
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twentieth century but has now largely been rejected) that collectively
bargained contracts between governments and unions of their employers
were unconstitutional as an improper delegation of government
authority. 134 Also in 1947, Ohio enacted the Ferguson Act, which
banned public employee strikes and provided for dismissing strikers.13 1
However, as the discussion of the Wisconsin above shows,
sentiments on public sector unions were shifting. Indeed, in 1959 - the
same year the Wisconsin law was enacted - Ohio authorized union dues
checkoff for public employees, overturning part of the Hagerman

ruling.13 6
In 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court held that school boards had the
authority to bargain with employees and form enforceable contracts,
including contracts requiring that contract grievances be sent to binding
arbitration.' 37 On the other hand, also in 1975, Republican Governor
James Rhodes vetoed a bill that would have given bargaining rights to
public employees in Ohio.' 38 In 1977, Governor Rhodes vetoed a

second such bill.13 9
As in Wisconsin, such a law would only be passed when Democrats
took control of the state House, Senate and governor's office. This
happened in Ohio in 1983, and Democratic Governor Richard Celeste
signed a public-sector labor law authorizing collective bargaining (and
again, in many cases, strikes) by public employees.14 0 This law, with
only minor amendments, has been Ohio's public sector labor law since
its effective date (although as shown infra, it looked as if the law had
been entirely revised in 2011, but then a voter referendum repealed the
changes).
One of the most notable effects of this law in the past thirty years and one that policymakers in the future should heed - is that it greatly
reduced the number of public-sector strikes in Ohio. This may seem
odd. Prior to the law, all public sector strikes were illegal; after the law
was passed, most public sector strikes were legal. Normally, one would
expect that legalizing an activity would mean that activity would happen
more often, not less. But after the law took effect, in the eight years
134. Id. at 246-54. For more on the role of the "non-delegation" doctrine in labor cases in the
first half of the 20th century, see SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS, supra note 20, at ch. 3.
135. Rise and Fall,supra note 130, at 479.
136. Id. at 480.
137. Dayton Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 323 N.E.2d 714, 717-719
(Ohio 1975).
138. Rise and Fall, supra note 130, at 480.
139. Id. at 480.
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117 (West 2007); see Rise andFall, supra note 130, at 480.
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from 1984 through 1992, there were 110 public sector strikes in Ohio,
seven of which were illegal.14 1 In contrast, in the years before the law
was passed, from 1974-1979 (obviously, a shorter time period), there
were 286 strikes, all illegal. 14 2 This law has continued to inhibit strikes
to the present time. From 1993-99, there were only fifty public sector
strikes in Ohio.14 3 From 2000-2010, there were only forty-three.144
How could this be? It is because Ohio's law provides various
procedures that unions and employers must go through before a union
can legally strike, procedures designed to bring the parties to an
agreement before the strike. Specifically, in Ohio, for those employees
who can strike (notably, police, fire, and corrections workers may not),
before they may strike, they must go through a series of procedures. The
Ohio statute sets out a "default" procedure the parties must use at
impasse, although it also permits the parties to jointly agree to alternate
procedures.14 5 The procedures are designed to bring the parties together,
and thus to avoid strikes.146
Specifically, under the default procedure, before striking the parties
must first go through mediation. 147 If that fails, they must go through a
fact-finding process.1 4 8 No later than seven days after the fact-finder's
findings and recommendations are sent to the parties, the parties must
each decide whether to accept or reject the recommendations, and
rejection requires a super-majority vote: a three-fifths vote of the
If neither side rejects the
legislative body and the union.14 9
recommendations, the recommendations are deemed agreed upon.5 o If
one or both sides reject the recommendations, SERB "shall publicize the
findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding panel"' 5 ' - a
rule clearly designed to allow public pressure to work on one or both
sides, again with the aim of bringing the parties together and avoiding a

141.
142.

Rise and Fall,supra note 130, at 480.
See Martin Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 MICH. J.

OF L. REF. 313, 364 tbl.3 (1993).
143. Rise and Fall, supranote 130, at 481.
144. Id. (citing PHILIP STEVENS, BENEFITS OF BARGAINING: How
NEGOTIATIONS
IMPROVE
OHIO
COMMUNITIES
8
(2011),

PUBLIC SECTOR
available
at

http://www.policymattersohio.org/BenefitsofBargaining.htm).
145.
146

§ 4117.14(C), (E).
Bureau
of
Mediation,

OHIO

STATE

EMP'T

RELATIONS

BD.,

www.serb.state.oh.us/sections/mediation.
147.
148.

§4117.14(C)(2).
§4117.14(C)(3).

149.
150

§ 4117.14(C)(6)(a).
Id.

151.

Id.
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strike. Finally, if the parties cannot reach agreement within seven days
after such publication, then public employees who are allowed to strike
may legally strike, but even then only after giving ten days' notice.152
These sorts of processes have reduced strikes not just in Ohio but in
other states as well. Studies have found that strikes were most likely to
occur in states without a bargaining law and least likely to occur in states
with a bargaining law that provided for binding interest arbitration.' 53 In
sum, one lesson of the past thirty years is that laws that provide
reasonable and fair ways to settle bargaining impasses - e.g., binding
interest arbitration, but also strikes - often produce more labor peace
than states without such laws.
IV. EBBS AND FLOWS IN THE 1990S AND AUGHTS
Even before 2011, public-sector labor law at the state level was
subject to shifting political tides.15 4 Some states limited public-sector
bargaining rights in the 1990s, especially for teachers' unions. For
example, in 1994, Michigan enacted some significant limits on
bargaining for teachers.' 55 The law as amended restricted the scope of
bargaining, barring negotiations on, among other things, the starting day
of the school term, the amount of required pupil contact time, decisions
to operate charter schools, and contracting out noninstructional
services.15 6 The law also imposed much stiffer penalties for illegal
strikes.'5 7 Also in the 1990s, Oregon added restrictions on the scope of
bargaining for teachers, excluding, among other things, the topics of
class size, the school calendar, teacher evaluation criteria, school
curriculum, dress and personal conduct codes for school personnel, and
student discipline. 58
Further, in 1993, Wisconsin enacted the "Qualified Economic
Offer" (QEO) rule.' 59 Under this rule, if a school district's wage offer
met a prescribed formula, it effectively could not be negotiated to a

152. § 4117.14(D).
153. See Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact of Collective-BargainingLegislation
on Disputes in the US. Public Sector: No Legislation May be the Worst Legislation, 37 J. L. &
ECON. 519, 538 (1994).
154. See Martin Malin, The Upheaval in the Public Sector: A Searchfor Common Elements,
27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 149 (2012) [hereinafter Upheaval in the Public- Sector]
155. Id at 151.
156. See id
157. See id
158. See id.
159. Id.
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higher level.16 0 Ohio prohibited bargaining on state university faculty
workloads.16 1 In 1995, the Chicago School Reform Act also limited the
scope of bargaining, barring the Chicago Public Schools and the City
Colleges of Chicago from bargaining over not just the decisions but also
the impact of decisions regarding, among other things, charter school
proposals, subcontracting, layoffs and reductions in force, class size,
class staffing, class schedules, the academic calendar, pupil assignment
policies, and the use of technology.16 2
In 1998, Pennsylvania enacted Act 46 which provided that if the
Philadelphia school system was found to be in financial distress, the
scope of bargaining would be greatly restricted.'6 3 For example,
subcontracting, RIFs, staffing patterns, assignments, class schedules, the
school calendar, pupil assessment, teacher preparation time, charter
schools, and the use of technology could not be bargained.'64
Finally, the entire New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations
Act was allowed to "sunset" in 1999.165
Still, in the early twenty first century, some states reversed course
and began expanding public sector bargaining rights. Illinois amended
the Chicago School Reform Act such that what were formerly illegal
subjects of bargaining now became permissive subjects (meaning that
while the employer and union were not required to bargaining about the
topics, they were legally allowed to do so).166 Also, the amendments
reduced the minimum number of workers required for statutory
coverage, and instituted interest arbitration for first contracts of
bargaining units of thirty-five or fewer employees.1 67
Wisconsin repealed the QEO rule.' 68 The state also gave collective
bargaining rights to state university faculty and research assistants, and
expanded topics of bargaining.169 For example, teacher preparation time
and changes to teacher evaluation rules became mandatory topics.170
160. Id.
161. See Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 125 (1999)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to the statute).
162. Upheaval in the Public- Sector, supra note 154, at 151; 111.Pub. Act 89-15 § 10 (codified
at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2011)).
163. Upheaval in the Public- Sector, supra note 154, at 151.

164.

Id.

165. Id.
166. Id; Ill. Pub. Act 93-3 §10
167. Upheaval in the Public- Sector, supra note 154, at 152; Ill. Pub. Act 93-3 (codified at 115
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 (West 2011)) (effective Apr. 16, 2003).
168. Upheaval in the Public- Sector, supra note 154, at 152.
169. Id
170. Id.
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In 2003, New Mexico enacted a collective bargaining statute for
public workers, replacing the law that had "sunset" a few years earlier
with an even stronger law.'
In 2004, Oklahoma extended collective
bargaining rights to employees of municipalities with populations of
35,000 or more.172
Perhaps most interestingly, a number of states adopted mandatory
"card check" recognition rules.' 73 Under such rules, if a union supplies
an employer with cards requesting a specific union represent employees,
and is signed by a majority of the members of an appropriate bargaining
unit (and such cards are not the product of coercion or fraud), the
employer must recognize the union.174 This is a more "union-friendly"
rule than that which exists in the private sector and in the majority of
public-sector jurisdictions, where an employer may voluntarily
recognize a union based on a "majority card" showing, but is not
required to do S0.175 Nonetheless, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, New
Hampshire, California and Massachusetts all adopted mandated _card
check_ recognition in their public-sector statutes in the "aughts."'
Also, a number of states granted collective bargaining rights to
home health care aides and in-home daycare providers (in part, by
specifying that the state was the employer). '77
On the other hand, there was some movement in the other direction
in the aughts. In 2004, governors of Indiana and Missouri withdrew
executive orders permitting state employees to bargain collectively.'7
Also, President Bush took a number of aggressive actions against federal
sector unions, including stripping collective bargaining rights from
employees in various agencies. For example, Executive Order 13252
took away such rights from employees of five sections of the
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Timothy Chandler & Rafael Gely, Card-Credit Laws and Public-Sector Union
Membership in the States, 36 LAB. STUD. J. 446, 446 (Dec. 2011).
174. Id.
175. See id at 446-47.
176. Id. at 446; Upheaval in the Public-Sector, supra note 154, at 152.
177. Upheaval in the Public- Sector, supra note 154, at 152; Peggie Smith, The Publicization
ofHome-Based Care Work in State LaborLaw, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1403-04 (2008).
178. Martin Malin, The Paradoxof Public-SectorLabor Law, 84 IND. L. J. 1369, 1369 (2009)
[hereinafter Paradox of Public-Sector]. In Indiana, Governor Evan Bayh had issued Executive
Order 90-6 (1990), which gave collective bargaining rights to state employees. In 2005, on his first
day in office, Governor Mitch Daniels, revoked this Executive Order. Martin Malin, Does Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A Perspectivefrom the United States, 35
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 277, 290-91, n. 72 (2008) [hereinafter Public Employee Collective
Bargaining].
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Department of Justice. 179 More famously, the Bush administration
barred collective bargaining for employees of the Transportation
Security Administration, and attempted to nearly eliminate such rights
for employees at the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the Department of Defense (DoD). 80 The regulations governing the
DHS were struck down, but the regulations covering the DoD were
upheld." '

Another significant event in this decade occurred in Missouri in
2007, when the Missouri Supreme Court reversed prior precedent and
held that public employees have a right under the Missouri State
Constitution to bargain collectively. 182 Specifically, the court held that a
clause added to the state Constitution in 1945 stating "employees shall
have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing" applies to public employees,
reversing a 1947 decision by the same court that had held the
opposite.'
This has led to some confusion over what specific rights employees
have. Missouri does have a limited public-sector labor statute, but it
excludes significant categories of public employees (notably, police and
teachers). 18 4 Thus, the Independence case meant that a large number of
public workers in Missouri now have the right to bargain collectively,
but only under the state Constitution. And the contours of this right
remain unclear. The Constitution does not provide any language beyond
what is quoted above; the state legislature has not passed a statute
attempting to enact the right; and Missouri courts have only begun to try
to define the rights and obligations of the parties.
Some interesting developments have already taken place. For
85
example, in Springfield Nat '1Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. Of Springfield,1
the local school board created a system for union recognition that
179. Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers Rights? What the Federal Government
Should Learnfrom History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 316 (2004)
[hereinafter HomelandSecurity vs. Workers Rights?].
180. See id. at 297.
181. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating
DHS regulations); AFGE v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding DoD
regulations).
182. Joseph Slater, Public-Sector Labor Law in Age of Obama, 87 IND. L. J. 189, 225 (2012)
[hereinafter Age ofObama].
183. Independence-Nat'1 Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 142 (Mo.
2007) (Price, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947).
184. Id. at 143.
185. Springfield Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Springfield, No. 0931-CV08322, (Cir. Ct.
Greene County Sept. 10, 2009).
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potentially allowed multiple unions to represent the same group of
teachers at the same time. The school board provided no explanation of
how this would work if the different unions had inconsistent goals or
strategies. 186 The Springfield court held that this was permitted, relying
largely on a dictionary definition of "collective bargaining" that defined
that term as "negotiation .. . between an employer or group of
employers on one side and a union or number of unions on the other."1 87
I have criticized this reasoning elsewhere, and noted that it was not
appealed because, after this decision, the affected teachers chose a "one
union representative" model instead."' Still, the potential for a public
employer in Missouri to use such a system remains.
In November 2012, the Missouri Supreme Court decided two more
cases on this Constitutional provision. In Eastern Missouri Coalitionof
Police, FraternalOrder of Police Lodge 15, City of Chesterfield v. City
of Chesterfield,189 the court held that the provision imposes a duty on
each city to bargain with unions, but cities were not required to set up
any specific type of framework for collective bargaining.' 90 Cities must
create their own procedures, the court explained, consistent with the
state constitution.' 9 1
In the companion case, American Federation of Teachers v.
Ledbetter,'92 the court held that the provision requires public employers
to meet and confer with the union in good faith, with a present intention
to reach an agreement.19 3 This is a somewhat tricky issue in Missouri, as
the Missouri public-sector statute does not require full-blown
"bargaining in good faith" but rather only a duty to "meet and confer" (a
somewhat lesser standard). 194 The court described its holding regarding
the standard under the state constitution as follows:
The course of a negotiation between parties acting in good faith should
reflect that both parties sincerely undertook to reach an agreement.
While there is an inherent tension between the duty to bargain with a
serious attempt to resolve differences and the employer's freedom to

186. Id. at *12-13.
187. Id at*14.
188. See Age of Obama, supra note 182, at 226-27.
189. E. Missouri Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. 2012).
190. Id. at 764.
191. Id. at 760.
192. Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2012).
193. Id. at 367.
194. Id at 363. For a discussion of this lesser standard, see MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra
note 13, at 457-554.
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reject any proposal, this tension serves to strike the balance intended
by the voters of Missouri in their adoption of article I, section 29.195
What, precisely, that means, and how other aspects of collective
bargaining should work under the Missouri Constitution may be a good
topic for discussion in a similar edition of this journal in the future,
because it may take decades to resolve. In any event, while the extent of
this right remains to be developed, this can be filed under the "positives"
column for public-sector unions in the aughts.
In sum, public sector labor law has long been subject to changes.
Nothing, however, prepared those in the field for what was going to
happen in 2011.
V. 2011 AND AFTER
In 2011, an unprecedented number of states enacted laws limiting
or eliminating public sector bargaining rights. Such moves took place in
Wisconsin, Ohio, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee. Others and I have listed the details of these changes
elsewhere.196 Thus, I will just cover the highlights below.
Wisconsin's Act 10 practically eliminated collective bargaining for
all public employees except for "public safety" employees, who were
exempted from the Act.197 Among other things, it eliminated collective
bargaining rights entirely for some employees, including those of the
University of Wisconsin (UW) system.198 For other, non-safety
employees, it limited the scope of bargaining to the single issue of
bargaining over total base wages, and even for that issue, no increase
could be greater than the percentage increase in the consumer price
index.199 It made the state a "right-to-work" jurisdiction. 200 Further, the
law makes it illegal for an employer to agree to automatic dues
deduction, even for employees who voluntarily wish to pay dues. It also
limits the duration of collective bargaining agreements to one year. 201

195. 387 S.W.3d at 367.
196. See, e.g., Age of Obama, supra note 182, at 203-12; Upheaval in the Public- Sector,
supra note 154, at 149-50.
197. See Age of Obama, supra note 182, at 203-05.
198. Id. at 204.
199. Id.
200 Id.

201.

See id.; see also Paul Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-SectorLabor Dispute of 2011, 27

ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 293-94 (2012) (discussing the background of Act 10).
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Act 10 also requires an unprecedented mandatory recertification
system under which every union must face a recertification election
every year, and the union is recertified only if "51 percent of the
employees in the collective bargaining unit - not merely those voting voted for recertification." 202 So, "if a bargaining unit had 400 members
and the recertification vote was 201 favoring union representation and
100 against, the union would be decertified (because 201 is less than 51
percent of 400)."203
Under the previous law, like almost all labor laws in the U.S., a
request "from 30 percent of the bargaining unit was required to schedule
a decertification election, decertification elections could not take place
during the terms of valid union contracts (except that there had to be a
'window period' every three years allowing a decertification election),
and the majority of those voting determined the outcome.204
In the spring of 2012, a federal district court upheld most of Act 10,
but enjoined the recertification provision and the bar on dues check-off
on both equal protection and First Amendment grounds. 205 The court
found no rational basis for distinguishing between "protective
occupations" and other public employees for these purposes, at least
none that did not offend the First Amendment (the court noted that those
exempted from Act 10 disproportionately supported Scott Walker in the
2010 election).2 06
However, the Seventh Circuit reversed this decision and upheld Act
10 in full. 207 The court noted that while all five public-sector unions that
had endorsed Governor Walker's candidacy in 2010 were excluded from
Act 10 as "public safety unions," some of the other excluded unions had
not endorsed Governor Walker.208 The court added:
Admittedly, the Unions do offer some evidence of viewpoint
discrimination in the words of then-Senate Majority Leader Scott
Fitzgerald suggesting Act 10, by limiting unions' fundraising capacity,
would make it more difficult for President Obama to carry Wisconsin
in the 2012 presidential election. While Senator Fitzgerald's statement

may not reflect the highest of intentions, his sentiments do not
invalidate an otherwise constitutional, viewpoint neutral law.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Age of Obama, supranote 182, at 204.
Id.
Id.
Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F.Supp.2d 856, 859 (W.D.Wis. 2012).
Id. at 860, 867.
Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 642 (7" Cir. 2013).
See id. at 643.
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Consequently, Act 10's prohibition on payroll dues deduction does not
violate the First Amendment. 209
The Seventh Circuit further held that the distinctions Act 10 makes
between "public safety" and other public-sector unions survive rational
basis scrutiny. 21 0 The court deemed the State's argument sufficient
which stated that if public safety officers were denied the rights Act 10
denies most public-sector unions, public safety officers might strike.211
Litigation continues, however, in Wisconsin state courts, where a lower
court has enjoined certain provisions of Act 10 and an appellate court
has refused to stay the injunction.212
Those familiar with the history can wonder at the irony. In the
decade leading up to the enactment of the Wisconsin law in 1959, one of
the biggest obstacles to passing such a law was the argument by
opponents of union rights that police should not have collective
bargaining rights.213 In 2011, when the Wisconsin law was gutted,
opponents of union rights argued that only police and closely-related
types of employees should have such rights.2 14
In Ohio, a fairly similar statute, SB-5, was enacted but then voided
by a voter referendum. 2 15 Among other things, SB-5 would have
eliminated collective bargaining rights for some employees, including at
least most college and university faculty and lower level supervisors in
police and fire departments. 2 16 For other employees, SB-5 would have
eliminated both the right to strike for those who have that right and
would have eliminated the right to binding interest arbitration for
employees who cannot strike.2 17 Instead, the parties would have had
only mediation and fact-finding, and if those did not lead to an
agreement, the public employer could have simply chosen its own final
offer. 2 18 SB-5 also would have imposed "right to work" rules, and it

209. Id. at 645.
210. Id. at 653.
211. See id. at 656.
212. Order denying motion for relief pending appeal, Madison Teachers Inc. v. Walker, No.
2012AP2067 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2013); See Court Declines to Stay Ruling Voiding
Wisconsin's Collective BargainingLaw, 11 WLR (BNA) 375 (Mar. 15, 2013).
213. See PUBLIC WORKERS, supranote 19, ch. 6.
214. See Carl Horowitz, State Judge Guts Wisconsin Public Employees Union Curbs; AG
Files
Appeal,
NAT'L
LEGAL
&
POL'Y
CENTER
(Sept.
19,
2012),
http://nlpc.org/stories/2012/09/19/state-judge-guts-wisconsin-public-employees-union-curbs.
215. See Rise and Fall,supra note 130, at 473.
216. Id. at 487.
217 See id. at 487-88.
218 See id

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss2/10

24

Slater: The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past
2013]1

UNSETTLED STATE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOR

535

would have greatly restricted the scope of bargaining.2 19
Ohio was one of the few "victories" for public sector unions in the
past few years (if one counts returning to the status quo ante as a
victory, which, in context, one probably should). Again, nine additional
states passed laws restricting the elimination of collective bargaining.220
One other state, Idaho, passed and then repealed such legislation.
In 2011, Idaho enacted SB 1108, which limited such collective
bargaining for teachers to "compensation" (defined, essentially, as
wages and benefits), limited the duration of collective bargaining
agreements to one year, and eliminated the requirement of fact-finding
(only mediation remained). 22 1 However, in the November, 2012
elections, in three ballot proposals, Idaho voters rejected the changes
made by SB 1108.222 Highlights from other state laws include the
following. Illinois limited subjects of bargaining for teachers and made
it more difficult for teachers, especially Chicago teachers, to strike
(requiring authorization from 75 percent of the bargaining unit).223
Indiana and Michigan also limited the scope of bargaining for teachers
in their state laws. 2 24 Michigan, in addition, enacted the Local
Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, which
allows the governor to appoint an "emergency manager" for local
governments; the manager can reject or modify any terms of contracts
with public-sector unions. 22 5 New Hampshire repealed its 2007 law that
provided for mandatory card check recognition.226 Oklahoma repealed
its 2004 law that required cities with populations of at least 35,000 to
bargain collectively with unions.227 Tennessee repealed its 1974 law that
219. See id. at 486.
220. See supra Part I.
221. See Age of Obama, supra note 182, at 208; See also Upheaval in Public-Sector, supra
note 154, at 158, 160 (detailing these and other laws of 2011).
222. See Amy Linn, Idaho Voters Say No to GOP-Backed School Overhaul, Anti-Union
Measure, 50 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA Online) 1402 (Nov. 20, 2012).
223. See Elizabeth G. Olson, Chicago Teachers' Strike: Everybody Wins, Really?, FORTUNE
(Sept. 20, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/09/20/chicago-teachers-stikeeverybody-wins-really/.
224. See New Laws Relating to Collective Bargaining And Benefits in the Public Sector,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASS'N
(Aug.
15,
2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/labor-law/meetings/201 1/ac2011/149.
authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter New Laws in Public Sector].
225. See CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL
DISTRICT
FISCAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACT
(Apr.
2011),
available
at
http://www.gomasa.org/news/crc-analyzes-local-govemment-and-school-district-fiscalaccountability-act.
226. See New Laws in the Public Sector, supra note 224.
227. See id.
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authorized collective bargaining for teachers and replaced it with a
unique "collaborative conferencing" system in which teachers will be
represented by any group that receives at least 15 percent or more of
votes in a confidential poll (as opposed to being represented by an
exclusive, majority representative).228 This may or may not matter
much, given that the scope of bargaining under the new Tennessee is
extremely narrow, and there is no impasse dispute mechanism. 229
Battles over legal rules affecting public sector unions continue. In
2012 and early 2013, a number of states have passed or proposed
legislation limiting or eliminating the use of dues check-off for publicsector unions.230 Some of these laws involve complete bans on dues
check-off, some on payroll deductions for political purposes only.23 1
Some of these laws apply to all unions, some only to certain unions.232
Legal challenges to these rules have met with mixed success in lower
courts.233 Such laws are more vulnerable to challenges when they
appear to distinguish among unions for politically-motivated purposes,
but the law in this area remains unsettled.2 34
On the other hand, in a rare piece of good news for public
employees in the past year or so, the Obama administration granted TSA
employees some limited collective bargaining rights, and they have
successfully negotiated a contract.235
Thus, public-sector labor law is still changing rather dramatically
(evolving or regressing, depending on one's perspective). The present
and future, as well as the past, are unsettled.
VI. POLICY AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS
What has caused this volatility? The most cynical and perhaps
obvious answer probably has the most explanatory power: partisan
politics. It is no coincidence that Wisconsin unions won the state
collective bargaining law only after Republicans lost control of state

228. See id
229. Age ofObama, supranote 182, at 211-12.
230. See Ann Hodges, Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public Sector Bargaining
Retrenchment, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 599, 603-604 (2012).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.at609-11.

234.

Id. at 616.

235. See Age of Obama, supranote 182, at 221-22; Louis LaBrecque, Airport Screeners Ratify
First-EverContract With TSA; Includes New PerformanceSystem 50 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
1373 (Nov. 13, 2012).
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government to the Democrats, and laws such as Wisconsin's Act 10 and
Ohio's SB-5 could only be passed when the states' legislatures and
executives were controlled by Republicans. Also, as the discussion of
PATCO notes, the partisan split on labor unions in general became
increasingly exacerbated in beginning in the 1980s.
But other issues have come to the forefront in recent years. The
most prominent arguments against collective bargaining in the public
sector are the notions that public sector workers are "overpaid" relative
to private sector workers, and a revamping of older claims that publicsector unions improperly interfere with democracy by giving unions
"two bites of the apple" on public-policy issues: lobbying and
bargaining.
A. Pocket-Book Issues: The Question ofPublic Employee Pay
Especially at the height of the recent recession, it was common to
stir up resentment against public sector unions with claims that these
employees were overpaid. I have also discussed this issue in detail
elsewhere.236
In sum, while there are some dissenting voices, a majority of
studies on this issue have found that public workers on the whole are
paid somewhat less than comparable private sector.2 37 Almost all studies
agree that at the bottom of the pay scale, public workers are somewhat
better compensated, while at the upper end, private sector workers are
paid more.238 Most studies agree that public workers generally receive
less in take home pay than analogous private workers, but that public
workers generally receive greater compensation in benefits. 23 9 Most of
the disagreements, therefore, are about employees in the middle of the
pay scale.240
Important issues and methodological differences include how to
calculate the value (and current cost) of future benefits; what employees
are comparable (e.g., the extent to which age, education and other
factors matter, given that public employees are generally older and better
educated); how to compare certain types of jobs across sectors

236. For a discussion of various pay studies, see Joseph Slater & Elijah Welenc, Are PublicSector Employees "Overpaid" Relative to Private-SectorEmployees? An Overview of the Studies,
53 WASHBURN L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
237 Id.(manuscript at 2).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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(especially given that some public sector jobs, like police and
firefighting, have no private-sector equivalents); and whether to assign
value to "job security" for government employees (and if so, how
much).24 1 Still, again, the majority of these studies to not support the
"public workers are overpaid!" arguments made in support of anti-union
legislation.
Further, when considering how policy should be made, one should
also understand that, in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
(including Ohio and Wisconsin), public-sector pension benefit formulas
are not legal subjects of collective bargaining. Rather, they are almost
always set by a separate statute governing pensions, and, in almost all
public-sector jurisdictions, pension formulas cannot be changed through
collective bargaining.2 42 This is one important way in which the public
sector typically differs from the private sector. Similarly, even if one
were to value "job security" as the compensation of public employees,
most such employees have "just cause" discharge protection not just
from union contracts, but also from civil service and teacher tenure
laws. 24 3 "In short, even the minority position that public sector workers
are "overpaid" does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that collective
bargaining rights should be [eviscerated]". 2 " Indeed, it would be more
logical to amend public sector pension formulas, as the vast majority of
states have in the recent past.245
B. Theory: Back to Wellington & Winter?
The more theoretical objection to public sector union rights is based
on arguments dating from the 1972 book by Harry Wellington and Ralph
Winter, The Union and the Cities.246 Two main parts of their thesis are:
(1) politicians will, for self-interested political reasons, be unable to
resist the demands of striking public-sector workers; and (2) collective
bargaining gives public workers too much power through "two bites of
the apple" (bargaining and lobbying).247 This thesis has recently been
revived by opponents of public sector unions, 2 48 and rebutted by those
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Age of Obama, supranote 182, at 194.
MALIN, HODGES & SLATER , supra note 13, at 134-82.
Slater & Welenc, supranote 236 (manuscript 2-3).
See Age ofObama, supra note 182, at 197-98.

246.

HARRY WELLINGTON & RALPH WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971).

247.
(2001).
248.

Id.; see Michael Gottesman, Wellington's Labors, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 77, 79-83
See e.g. John McGinnis & Maz Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions,
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favoring public-sector collective bargaining rights.249
In short, the basic responses are, first, that history has shown that
public-sector strikes are often unpopular and that politicians can and do
effectively resist (and not infrequently, crush) them. In addition to the
PATCO strike above, also consider the very unpopular (and
unsuccessful) strike by New York transit workers in 2007. Many other
examples exist. 2 50 Thus, incentives for political leaders have often not
been what Wellington and Winter predicted. Recall also the experiences
in Ohio and elsewhere (discussed supra) where collective bargaining
laws actually reduced the number of public employee strikes.
Second, limiting union influence on matters of public policy has
long been accomplished by using appropriate scope of bargaining rules.
Clyde Summers made this response to Wellington and Winter most
famously in a 1987 article, 25 1 and essentially all public-sector labor laws
adopt this approach as a matter of practice. Issues that are truly matters
of public policy are not mandatory subjects in public-sector labor
statutes.252 To pick two examples, first, even before Act 10 in
Wisconsin, the decision of whether to have a "year round" school
schedule instead of the traditional summer break was held not to be a
253
mandatory subject of negotiation. Second, a California case held that a
police policy governing when police officers had authorization to
discharge a firearm was not negotiable.254 Also, external statutes (e.g.,
civil service rules and teacher tenure rules) often also make various
topics that would be mandatory in the private sector non-negotiable in

POL'Y REv., no. 162 (Aug. 1, 2010), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/43266. Rise and Fall, supra note 130, at 499-500 (arguing that the theory used by
Wellington and McGinnis does not accurately describe reality because public-sector employees are
undercompensated compared to private-sector employees).
249. See e.g. Keefe, supra note 12, at 274; See also Martin Malin, Does Public Employee
Collective BargainingDistort Democracy? A Perspectivefrom the UnitedStates, 34 CoMP. LAB. L.
& POL. J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 305) (on file with authors).
250. See Craig Olson, Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR
BARGAINING: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES 160, 162 (Aaron, Najita &

Stem eds., 2d ed. 1988).
251. See generally Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government's Business: Principlesand
Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REv. 265 (1987) (arguing that public employee bargaining process should be
shaped to fit its special function).
252. MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 457-524 (discussing scope of bargaining
rules in various states).
253. See Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 27972-C (Wis. Emp't
Relations Comm'n Mar. 18, 1996), http://www.wisbar.org/res/wercd/1996/27972-c.htm.; See also
MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 13, at 486-490.
254. See San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 78 Cal.App.3d 935, 948 (1978).
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the public sector.255 In short, if a subject is truly a matter of public
policy, unions do not get "two bites of the apple" (lobbying and
bargaining), because they are not permitted to bargain about it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given that thirty years ago, public-sector unions had won the right
to bargain collectively in the federal sector and in the clear majority of
states, and given that union density rates in the public sector then
through now have consistently stayed in the 35-40% range, law and
policy in this area has remained contested and strangely unsettled. It
would be unwise to bet against this continuing in coming decades.
Statutes and executive orders granting or restricting and even
eliminating collective bargaining rights will, in all likelihood, come and
go in a number of states.
Of course, many states will maintain their public-sector bargaining
laws, and a few will not seriously consider enacting one. But even in
these states, battles will continue. Unions will continue to organize and
be active even where they are not allowed to bargain collectively. As
noted above and as shown in detail elsewhere, historically, public sector
unions organized and acted to represent their members long before any
law gave them the right to bargain collectively. 2 56 Today, unions in
states that lack collective bargaining rights are active and represent their
members in a variety of ways. For example, Virginia prohibits public
sector collective bargaining, and yet public sector union density in that
state is more than 9 percent. Unions there and in North Carolina, which
also bar all public-sector collective bargaining, represent their members
in various legal fora, work on political campaigns, and do on-the-job
training and other tasks.257 This will continue in the next thirty years.
Similarly, opponents of unions will seek restrictions on union rights
and powers, even in states where the basic right to bargain collectively
remains in place. Perhaps the most dramatic (and surprising) example of
this came when Michigan became a "right-to-work" state in 2012.258

255. MALIN, HODGES & SLATER , supra note 13, at 529-50.
256. See PUBLIC WORKERS, supra note 19, 71-97 (introducing the history of public sector
labor law before legalized collective bargaining),
257. See Ann Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The PolarOpposites on the Public Sector
Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORN. J. L. & PUB. POL. 735, 748-49; see also Hodges & Warwick, supra
note 16, at 275-76.
258. See Nora Macaluso, Bills Speed Through Legislature to Make Michigan "Right-to-Work"
State, 50 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1485 (Dec. 11, 2012).
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Some similar surprise will likely occur in the future. On the other hand,
where unions have lost rights, they are likely to fight to regain them. As
shown above, it took Wisconsin unions almost a decade to get the first
public-sector labor law passed; they may spend another decade trying to
put it back in place.
Ideally, one would hope for a robust, interesting, and productive
debate on public-sector labor issues. This subject offers a wonderful
opportunity for such a discussion for several reasons. Because many
state public-sector labor laws differ in key (and arguably more minor)
areas, one can compare, contrast, and learn from best practices and
results. It is the classic laboratory of democracy. Further, it is
interesting to consider not only which rules from the private sector
should be imported to the public sector, but also - especially considering
the greater success of unions in the public sector - to consider which
rules from the public sector might improve private-sector law.
The challenge, however, will be to avoid using the rights of public
employees and their representatives as a partisan football. Too often, in
the past few years, the attacks on public-sector collective bargaining
rights - and on public employees themselves - have seemed to have

been motivated in large part by the desire of one political party to cripple
a major supporter of the other political party. Of course it would be
naive to think that this has not always been true to some extent (consider
Wisconsin in 1959 as well as in 2011). But, perhaps beginning with
PATCO, positions have hardened in the past thirty years.
It would be a shame if this continued into the next thirty. The
rights of working people and their representatives, and the desire for
effective, efficient government, should be bipartisan concerns. The
extent to which those two goals are seen as conflicting will, in large part,
determine the extent to which public-sector labor law remains unsettled
in the future. For the record, I do not believe that these goals conflict.
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